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Abstract
This paper investigates a class of multi-player discrete games where each player aims to maximize its own utility function.
Each player does not know the other players’ action sets, their deployed actions or the structures of its own or the others’
utility functions. Instead, each player only knows its own deployed actions and its received utility values in recent history.
We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm which converges to the set of action profiles which have maximal stochastic
potential with probability one. Furthermore, the convergence rate of the proposed algorithm is quantified. The algorithm
performance is verified using two case studies in the smart grid and cybersecurity.
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1 Introduction
Game theory provides a mathematically rigorous frame-
work for multiple players to reason about each other.
In recent years, game theoretic learning has been in-
creasingly used to control large-scale networked systems
due to its inherent distributed nature. In particular, the
network-wide objective of interest is encoded as a game
whose Nash equilibria correspond to desired network-
wide configurations. Numerical algorithms are then syn-
thesized for the players to identify Nash equilibria via
repeated interactions. Multi-player games can be cate-
gorized into discrete games and continuous games. In
a discrete (resp. continuous) game, each player has a
finite (resp. an infinite) number of action candidates.
As for discrete games, learning algorithms include best-
response dynamics, better-response dynamics, factitious
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play, regret matching, logit-based dynamics and replica-
tor dynamics. Please refer to (Basar and Olsder, 1999;
Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Sandholm, 2010; Young,
2001) for detailed discussion. As an important class of
continuous games, generalized Nash games were first for-
mulated in Arrow and Debreu (1954), and see survey
paper Facchinei and Kanzow (2007) for a comprehensive
exposition. A number of algorithms have been proposed
to compute generalized Nash equilibria, including, to
name a few, ODE-based methods Rosen (1965), nonlin-
ear Gauss-Seidel-type approaches Pang et al. (2008), it-
erative primal-dual Tikhonov schemes Yin et al. (2011),
and best-response dynamics Palomar and Eldar (2010).
Game theory and its learning have found many appli-
cations; e.g., traffic routing in Internet Altman et al.
(2002), urban transportation Roumboutsos and Kapros
(2008), mobile robot coordination (Arslan et al., 2007;
Hatanaka et al., 2016) and power markets (Wang et al.,
2012; Zhu, 2014).
In many applications, players can only access limited
information about the game of interest. For example,
each player may not know the structure of its own util-
ity function. Additionally, during repeated interactions,
each player may not be aware of the actions of other
players. These informational constraints motivate recent
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study on payoff-based or reinforcement learning algo-
rithms where the players adjust their actions only based
on their own previous actions and utility measurements.
The papers (Marden et al., 2009; Zhu and Mart´ınez,
2013; Hatanaka et al., 2016) study discrete games, and
their approaches are based on stochastic stability Foster
and Young (1990). As mentioned in Remark 3.2 of Zhu
and Mart´ınez (2013), paper Marden et al. (2009) pro-
poses an algorithm to find Nash equilibrium of weakly
acyclic games with an arbitrarily high probability by
choosing an arbitrarily small and fixed exploration rate
in advance. The analysis in Marden et al. (2009) is based
on homogeneous Markov chains and more specifically
the theory of resistance trees Young (1993). Zhu and
Mart´ınez (2013) extends the results in Marden et al.
(2009) by adopting diminishing exploration rates and en-
sures convergence to Nash equilibrium and global optima
with probability one. The analysis of Zhu and Mart´ınez
(2013) is based on based on strong ergodicity of inhomo-
geneous Markov chains. As for continuous games, the pa-
pers (Frihauf et al., 2012; Liu and Krstic, 2011; Stankovic
et al., 2012) employ extremum seeking and the paper Zhu
and Frazzoli (2016) uses finite-difference approximations
to estimate unknown partial (sub)gradients. Notice that
all the aforementioned papers focus on asymptotic con-
vergence and none of them quantifies convergence rates.
Contribution: In this paper, we study a class of multi-
player discrete games where each player is unaware of
the other players’ action sets, their deployed actions or
the structures of its own or the others’ utility functions.
We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm where,
at each iteration, each player, on one hand, exploits suc-
cessful actions in recent history via comparing received
utility values, and on the other hand, randomly explores
any feasible action with a certain exploration rate. The
algorithm is proven to be convergent to the set of action
profiles with maximum stochastic potential with proba-
bility one. Furthermore, an upper bound on the conver-
gence rate is derived and is minimized when the explo-
ration rates are restricted to p-series. When the interac-
tions of the players consist of a weakly acyclic game and
the received utilities are subject to uniformly bounded
random noises, the convergence to the set of pure anti-
E-Nash equilibria is guaranteed. The algorithm perfor-
mance is verified using two case studies in the smart
grid and cybersecurity. A preliminary version of this pa-
per was published in Zhu et al. (2014) where conver-
gence rates and measurement noises are not discussed.
Further, Zhu et al. (2014) focuses on the application on
adaptive cyber defense, and this paper focuses on the-
ory of learning in games. The analysis of two papers is
significantly different.
2 Problem formulation and learning algorithm
In this section, we introduce a class of multi-player games
where the information each player accesses is limited.
Fig. 1. Game model
Then, we present a learning algorithm under which the
action profiles of the players converge to the set of action
profiles which have maximum stochastic potential.
2.1 Game formulation
The system model in Figure 1 characterizes the inter-
actions of N players in a non-cooperative game. Each
component in the figure will be discussed in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
Players. We consider N players V , {1, · · · , N} and
each player has a finite set of actions. Let Ai denote the
action set of player i and ai ∈ Ai denote an action of
player i. Denote S , A1 × · · · × AN as the Cartesian
product of the action sets, where s , (a1, · · · , aN ) ∈ S
is denoted as an action profile of the players.
Utility. Under the influence of an action profile, the sys-
tem generates a utility value for each player. The utility
function for player i ∈ V is defined as ui : S → R. At
the end of iteration t, the utility value ui(t) = ui(s(t)) is
measured and sent to player i. The utility value received
by player i is denoted by u˜i(t) , ui(t) + wi(t), where
wi(t) is the measurement noise.
Informational constraint. Each player does not
know the other players’ action sets or their deployed
actions. Besides, each player is unaware of the struc-
ture of its own or the others’ utility functions. At
iteration t, each player only knows its deployed ac-
tions and its received utility values in the past; i.e.,
ai(0), · · · , ai(t− 1), u˜i(0), · · · , u˜i(t− 1).
The above informational constraint has been studied in
several recent papers. For example, the authors in (Zhu
and Mart´ınez, 2013; Stankovic et al., 2012; Hatanaka
et al., 2016) investigate coverage optimization problems
for mobile sensor networks where mobile sensors are un-
aware of environmental distribution functions. The au-
2
thors in Marden et al. (2013) study the problem of op-
timizing energy production in wind farms where each
turbine knows neither the functional form of the power
generated by the wind farm nor the choices of other
turbines. The authors in (Frihauf et al., 2012; Zhu and
Frazzoli, 2016) consider convex games where each player
cannot access its game components.
2.2 Problem statement
Under the above informational constraint, we aim to
synthesize a learning algorithm under which the action
profiles of the players converge to the set of action pro-
files with maximum stochastic potential. We will quan-
tify the convergence rate of the proposed algorithm in
contrast to asymptotic convergence in existing work.
2.3 Learning algorithm
Inspired by Zhu and Mart´ınez (2013), we propose a
learning algorithm called the RL algorithm, where each
player updates its actions only based on its previous
actions and its received utility values. On the one hand,
each player chooses the most successful action in recent
history. It represents the exploitation phase. However,
the exploitation is not sufficient to guarantee that the
player can choose the best action given others’. So on
the other hand, the player uniformly chooses one action
from its action set. It represents the exploration phase.
The specific update rule is stated in the RL algorithm.
At iterations t = 0 and t = 1, each player uniformly
chooses one action from its action set as initialization
(Line 3). Starting from iteration t = 2, with probability
1 − ˜i(t), player i chooses the action which generates a
higher utility value in last two iterations as current ac-
tion (Line 8-13). This represents the exploitation where
player i reinforces its previous successful actions. With
probability ˜i(t), player i uniformly selects an action
from its action set Ai (Line 14). This represents the
exploration and makes sure that each action profile is se-
lected infinitely often. Note that sample(Ai) in Line 14
represents uniformly choosing one element from set Ai.
3 Analysis
In this section, we will present the analytical results of
the RL algorithm.
3.1 Notations and assumptions
We first introduce the notations and assumptions used
throughout the paper. Denote by |V| the cardinality of
player set, |Ai| the cardinality of action set of player i and
|A|∞ , max
i∈V
|Ai| the maximum cardinality among all
action sets. The exploration rate for player i at iteration
t is decomposed into two parts; i.e., ˜i(t) , i(t) + ei(t),
Algorithm 1. Reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm
1: while 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 do
2: for i ∈ V do
3: ai(t)← sample(Ai);
4: end for
5: end while
6: while t ≥ 2 do
7: for i ∈ V do
8: With prob. (1− ˜i(t)),
9: if u˜i(t− 1) ≥ u˜i(t− 2) then
10: ai(t) = ai(t− 1);
11: else
12: ai(t) = ai(t− 2);
13: end if
14: With prob. ˜i(t), a
i(t)← sample(Ai);
15: end for
16: end while
where i(t) = γi
c(t), γi > 0, 
c(t) is common for
all the players and ei(t) represents the exploration
deviation. Define e(t) , (e1(t), · · · , eN (t))T , ˜(t) ,
(˜1(t), · · · , ˜N (t))T and (t) , (1(t), · · · , N (t))T . And
we define er(t) , ||e(t)||N∞/
N∏
i=1
˜i(t). Here we denote by
|| · ||∞ the infinity norm of a vector. In addition, we also
use || · || to represent the L1-norm of a vector, and ||P ||
to represent the 1-norm of a matrix. We assume the
measurement noises satisfy:
Assumption 1 For each i ∈ V, {wi(t)}t≥0 is a sequence
of real-valued random variables that are independent and
identically distributed (I.I.D.).
I.I.D. random noises are widely adopted in distributed
control and optimization problems and see (Xiao et al.,
2007; Huang and Manton, 2009). In addition, we assume
the exploration rates satisfy:
Assumption 2 (1). For each i ∈ V, i(t) ∈ (0, 1] is
non-negative, strictly decreasing, and lim
t→∞ i(t) = 0.(2).
For each i ∈ V, the sequences {
N∏
i=1
i(t)} and {
N∏
i=1
˜i(t)}
are not summable. (3). lim
t→∞ er(t) = 0.
Assumption 2 indicates that the players can choose
heterogeneous exploration rates. The exploration rates
diminish slowly enough and their deviations decrease in
faster rates than the common part. In the paper Zhu
and Mart´ınez (2013), it is assumed that exploration
rates i(t) are identical for all i, diminishing and not
summable. Assumption 2 allows for heterogeneous ex-
ploration rates and includes homogeneous exploration
rates in the paper Zhu and Mart´ınez (2013) as a special
case. Actually, papers (Koshal et al., 2013; Yousefian
et al., 2013) adopt heterogenous step-sizes for dis-
tributed optimization and game theory. They impose
similar assumptions on the step-sizes.
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Markov chain induced by the RL algorithm. De-
note by Z , S × S the state space, where each state
z(t) , (s(t), s(t + 1)) consists of the action profiles
at iteration t and the next iteration. And denote by
diag(S × S) , {(s, s)|s ∈ S} the diagonal space of Z.
By the definition of z(t), the sequence {z(t)}t≥0 forms a
time-inhomogeneous Markov chain, denoted byM. We
define P ˜(t) as the transition matrix of Markov chainM
at iteration t, where each entry P ˜(t)(z′, z) represents the
transition probability from state z′ to z. Besides, denote
by pi(t) the distribution on Z at iteration t.
z-tree of time-homogenous Markov chain M˜.
Given any two distinct states z′ and z of Markov chain
M˜, consider all paths starting from z′ and ending at z.
Denote by pz′z the largest probability among all possible
paths from z′ to z. A path might contain intermediate
states z1, · · · , zk (k = 0 means there is no interme-
diate state) between z′ and z. So pz′z is the product
of P ˜(z′, z1), P ˜(z1, z2), · · · , P ˜(zk, z). We define graph
G(˜) where each vertex of G(˜) is a state z of Markov
chain M˜ and the probability on edge (z′, z) is pz′z. A
z-tree on G(˜) is a spanning tree rooted at z such that
from every vertex z′ 6= z, there is a unique path from
z′ to z. Denote by G˜(z) the set of all z-trees on G(˜).
The total probability of a z-tree is the product of the
probabilities of its edges. The stochastic potential of the
state z is the largest total probability among all z-trees
in G˜(z). Let Λ(˜) be the states which have maximum
stochastic potential for a particular ˜ ∈ (0, 1]. Denote
the limit set Λ∗ , lim
˜→0
Λ(˜). And the elements in Λ∗ are
referred to as stochastically stable states.
Remark 1 The above notions are inspired by the resis-
tance trees theory Young (1993). However, the above no-
tions are defined for any ˜ ∈ (0, 1] instead of ˜→ 0 in the
resistance trees theory. This allows us to characterize the
transient performance of the RL algorithm. 2
3.2 Main analytical result
The following theorem is the main analytical result of
this paper. It shows that the state z(t) converges to the
set of stochastically stable state with probability one.
Moreover, the convergence rate is quantified using the
distance between pi(t) and the limiting distribution pi∗;
i.e., D(t) , ||pi(t)−pi∗||. The formal proof of Theorem 1
will be given in Section 5.
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1 - 2 hold, the following
properties hold for the RL algorithm:
(P1) lim
t→∞Pr{z(t) ∈ Λ
∗} = 1 and Λ∗ ⊆ diag(S × S);
(P2) there exist positive integer tmin and positive con-
stant C such that for any t∗ > tmin and t ≥ t∗ + 1, the
following is true:
D(t) ≤ C(||(t∗)||∞ + ||(t)||∞ + er(t∗)
exp(−
t−1∑
τ=t∗
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai|) + exp(−
t−1∑
τ=t∗
N∏
i=1
˜i(τ)|Ai|)).
(1)
4 Discussion
4.1 Weakly acyclic games
In this section, we study the special case where the inter-
actions of the players consist of a weakly acyclic game. A
game is called to be weakly acyclic if from every action
profile, there exists a finite best-response improvement
path leading from the action profile to a pure Nash equi-
librium. In addition, we further assume that the mea-
surement noises are uniformly upper bounded.
Assumption 3 There is constant E ≥ 0, such that
|wi(t)| ≤ E ,∀i ∈ V and t ≥ 0.
We will show the convergence of the RL algorithm to
the set of equilibria defined as follows when the game is
weakly acyclic.
Definition 1 (Anti-E-Nash equilibrium) An action pro-
file s∗ , (a1∗, · · · , ai∗, · · · , aN∗ ) is an anti-E-Nash equilib-
rium if ∀i ∈ V,∀ai ∈ Ai, ui(s∗) ≥ ui(ai, a−i∗ ) + 2E.
Remark 2 Anti-E-Nash equilibrium is stronger than
pure Nash equilibrium and E-approximate Nash equi-
librium Nisan et al. (2007). When E = 0, anti-E-Nash
equilibrium reduces to Nash equilibrium. In the E-
approximate Nash equilibrium, the inequality becomes
ui(s∗) ≥ ui(ai, a−i∗ ) − 2E. So any anti-E-Nash equilib-
rium is also a Nash equilibrium and any Nash equilibrium
is an E-approximate Nash equilibrium. The reverses are
not true in general. 2
Denote the set of anti-E-Nash equilibria of the game Γ
as NE−(Γ) and diag(NE−(Γ) × NE−(Γ)) , {(s, s)|s ∈
NE−(Γ)}. The following corollary implies that the action
profiles converge to NE−(Γ) with probability one.
Corollary 1 If Assumptions 1 - 3 hold, Γ is a weakly
acyclic game and NE−(Γ) 6= ∅, then it holds that
lim
t→∞Pr{z(t) ∈ diag(NE−(Γ) × NE−(Γ))} = 1 for the
RL algorithm.
From Theorem 1, we have lim
t→∞Pr{z(t) ∈ Λ
∗} = 1 and
Λ∗ ⊆ diag(S × S). Then following the proofs of Lemma
4.2 and Claims 3 -4 in the Proposition 4.3 in Zhu and
Mart´ınez (2013), we can get that Λ∗ ⊆ diag(NE−(Γ) ×
NE−(Γ)) if Γ is weakly acyclic and NE−(Γ) 6= ∅.
Remark 3 As shown in (Zhu and Mart´ınez, 2013; Mar-
den et al., 2009), when games are weakly acyclic, stochas-
tically stable states are contained in the set of pure Nash
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equilibrium. Towards our best knowledge, weakly acyclic
games are the most general ones which have such prop-
erty. When a game is not weakly acyclic, stochastically
stable states can still be used to characterize where the
algorithm converges. So, stochastically stable states are
of broader applicability than pure Nash equilibrium. 2
4.2 Estimate of constant C in inequality (1)
The following corollary estimates constant C in in-
equality (1) when the measurement noises are absent.
For presentation simplicity, denote |γ|min , min
i∈V
γi,
Cmin , min{( |γ|min|A|∞ )N |Z|, 1}, Cmax , max{1, ||γ||
N |Z|
∞ }
and C , 8N |Z||Z|+4(N + 1)|Z|2N |Z|CmaxCmin .
Corollary 2 If Assumptions 1 - 2 hold, wi(t) = 0
and the exploration rates satisfy that ||˜(t)||∞ ≤
Cmin/2(N |Z||Z|+3(N + 1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax) for all t, then
the constant C in inequality (1) can be estimated as
C = max{|Z|, 4N , 4C}.
The proof of Corollary 2 will be given in Section 5.4.
4.3 Explicit convergence rate
If the exploration rates and exploration deviations are
given, we can explicitly quantify how fast the algorithm
will reach the set Λ∗. Assume the exploration rate for
player i is 1|Ai|t1/N , and the exploration deviations are
ei(t) = 0,∀i ∈ V. By Theorem 1, we have:
D(t) ≤ C
(
2 exp(−
t−1∑
τ=t∗
1
τ
) +
1
t∗1/N
+
1
t1/N
)
= C
2 exp(t∗−1∑
τ=1
1
τ
−
t−1∑
τ=1
1
τ
) +
1
t∗1/N
+
1
t1/N

≤ C
(
2 exp(1 +
∫ t∗−1
1
1
x
dx−
∫ t
1
1
x
dx)
+
1
t∗1/N
+
1
t1/N
)
= C
(
2 exp
(
1−
∫ t
t∗−1
1
x
dx
)
+
1
t∗1/N
+
1
t1/N
)
≤ C
(
2e(t∗ − 1)
t
+
2
t∗1/N
)
. (2)
The second inequality of (2) is a result of inequality (2)
of Chlebus (2009). Given any δ > 0, D(t) ≤ δ for all
t ≥ e(4C)N+1
δN+1
− 4Ceδ . Roughly speaking, it takes O( 1δN+1 )
iterations to reach error δ.
4.4 Optimal exploration rates
An interesting question is how to choose the exploration
rates to minimize the upper bound in inequality (1).
This is an infinite-dimension and non-convex optimiza-
tion problem and hard to solve in general. For analyt-
ical tractability, we restrict the exploration rates to be
p-series which have been widely used in stochastic ap-
proximation and convex optimization (Bertsekas, 2015;
Hasminskii and Silver, 1972; Kushner and Yin, 2003).
In particular, let ei(t) = 0 and i(t) =
1
|Ai|tp/N ,p ∈
(0, 1],∀i ∈ V. This choice satisfies Assumption 2. We
aim to choose p ∈ (0, 1] to minimize the upper bound of
D(t). With such restriction, inequality (1) becomes:
D(t) ≤ C(2 exp(−
t−1∑
τ=t∗
1
τp
) +
1
t∗p/N
+
1
tp/N
)
≤ C(2 exp(1−
∫ t
t∗−1
1
xp
dx) +
1
t∗p/N
+
1
tp/N
). (3)
The second inequality of (3) follows the same steps of
(2) by replacing 1τ with
1
τp . When p ∈ (0, 1), inequality
(3) becomes:
D(t)
≤ C(2 exp(1 + (t
∗ − 1)1−p − t1−p
1− p ) +
1
t∗p/N
+
1
tp/N
)
= C
(
2 exp(1 +
(t∗ − 1)1−p
1− p ) exp(
−t1−p
1− p )
+
1
t∗p/N
+
1
tp/N
)
.
Since lim
t→∞
t1−p
1−p
p
N ln t
= ∞, we have lim
t→∞
exp(−t
1−p
1−p )
exp(− pN ln t) = 0.
So the term 1
tp/N
dominates the term C(2 exp(1 +
(t∗−1)1−p
1−p ) exp(
−t1−p
1−p ) as t increases. When p = 1, in-
equality (3) becomes:
D(t) ≤ C(2 exp(1 + ln(t∗ − 1)− ln t) + 1
t∗1/N
+
1
t1/N
)
= C(2 exp(1 + ln(t∗ − 1))1
t
+
1
t∗1/N
+
1
t1/N
).
Analogously, we have lim
t→∞(
1
t )/(
1
t1/N
) = 0. So the term
1
t1/N
dominates the term 1t as t increases. In both cases,
1
tp/N
dominates the upper bound in (3). When p =
1, 1
tp/N
decreases fastest among p ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore,
i(t) =
1
|Ai|t1/N is optimal among p-series.
4.5 Memory and communication
The RL algorithm only requires each player to remember
its own utility values and actions in recent history. So
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the memory cost is low. In addition, communications are
case dependent. In Zhu and Mart´ınez (2013), the util-
ity function of each robot only depends on the actions
of its own and nearby robots. The communication range
of each robot is twice of its sensing range. So the com-
munication graphs are time-varying and usually sparse.
In Section 6.1, each customer can communicate with the
system operator. So the communication graph is a fixed
star graph.
5 Proofs
We will prove Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 in this section.
5.1 Analysis of the H-RL algorithm
For the sake of analysis, we introduce the H-RL algo-
rithm, which has time-homogeneous exploration rates;
i.e., ˜(t) = ˜ ∈ (0, 1],∀t ≥ 0 in the RL algorithm. Then
{z(t)} in the H-RL algorithm forms a time-homogeneous
Markov chainM˜ withbe the transition matrix P ˜. The
analysis of the H-RL algorithm provides preliminary re-
sults for that of the RL algorithm. The following lemma
studies the properties of the feasible transitions in the
Markov chainM˜.
Lemma 1 Given any ˜ ∈ (0, 1], if Assumption 1 holds,
then each nonzero entry in transition matrix P ˜ is a poly-
nomial of the variables {˜i, 1 − ˜i}i∈V . In addition, the
coefficients of the polynomials are independent of ˜.
PROOF. Consider any two states x, y ∈ Z that the
transition from x to y is feasible within one step. In
particular, x = (s(0), s(1)) and y = (s(1), s(2)), where
s(t) = (a1(t), · · · , aN (t)) for t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. And the tran-
sition probability isP ˜(x, y) =
∏
i∈V
Pr{ai(2)|ai(0), ai(1)}.
If player i performs exploitation with ai(0) 6= ai(1)
and ui(s(0)) ≥ ui(s(1)) but ai(2) = ai(1), we
call this event a mis-exploitation between s(0) and
s(1). By Assumption 1, the mis-exploitation between
s(0) and s(1) of player i happens with probability
δi(s(0), s(1)) , Pr{wi(0)−wi(1) < ui(s(1))−ui(s(0))}
if ai(0) 6= ai(1) and δi(s(0), s(1)) , 0 if ai(0) = ai(1).
The probability δi(s(0), s(1)) is independent of ˜ and
only determined by the two utility values ui(s(0)) and
ui(s(1)) because {wi(t)}t≥0 are I.I.D. Given states
x and y, the set of players can be partitioned into
three sets: Ver(x, y) , {i ∈ V|ai(2) 6∈ {ai(0), ai(1)}},
Vex(x, y) , {j ∈ V|aj(2) = aj(arg max
t∈{0,1}
{uj(s(t))})}
and Vm(x, y) , {k ∈ V|δk(s(0), s(1)) 6= 0} ∩ {k ∈
V|ak(2) = ak(arg min
t∈{0,1}
{uk(s(t))})}. For any i ∈
Ver(x, y), P r{ai(2)|ai(0), ai(1)} = ˜i|Ai| . And for any
j ∈ Vex(x, y), aj(2) can be achieved by exploita-
tion without mis-exploitation or exploration, then
Pr{aj(2)|aj(0), aj(1)} = (1 − δj(s(0), s(1)))(1 − ˜j) +
˜j
|Aj | . Similarly, for any k ∈ Vm(x, y), ak(2) can be
achieved by mis-exploitation or exploration, then
Pr{ak(2)|ak(0), ak(1)} = δk(s(0), s(1))(1 − ˜k) + ˜k|Ak| .
Then the transition probability can be written as:
P ˜(x, y) =
∏
i∈Ver(x,y)
˜i
|Ai|
×
∏
j∈Vex(x,y)
(
(1− δj(s(0), s(1)))(1− ˜j) + ˜j|Aj |
)
×
∏
k∈Vm(x,y)
(
δk(s(0), s(1))(1− ˜k) + ˜k|Ak|
)
. (4)
It is clear that P ˜(x, y) is a polynomial of {˜i, 1− ˜i}i∈V
with coefficients independent of ˜. 2
Given any ˜ ∈ (0, 1], define stochastic vector pi∗(˜) as
the stationary distribution of the Markov chainM˜; i.e.,
pi∗(˜)TP ˜ = pi∗(˜)T . In the H-RL algorithm, when a
player performs exploration, it can choose any element
in its action set. One can see that, for any pair of states
x, y ∈ Z, y can be reached from xwithin finite steps, and
Markov chainM˜ is ergodic. By Lemma 3.1 in Chapter
6 of Freidlin et al. (2012), pi∗(˜) can be written as follows:
pi∗(˜) ,
[
pi∗z1(˜) · · · pi∗z|Z|(˜)
]T
, (5)
where pi∗z(˜) =
σz(˜)∑
z′∈Z
σz′ (˜)
, σz(˜) =
∑
T∈G˜(z)
∏
(z′,z)∈E(T )
P ˜(z′, z) and E(T ) is the edge set of tree T .
5.2 Stationary distributions without exploration devia-
tions
Now let us consider an auxiliary scenario that explo-
ration deviations ei(t) = 0 for all t and for all i ∈ V. Then
stochastic vector pˆi∗((t)) such that pˆi∗((t))TP (t) =
pˆi∗((t))T has the same form of (5) with exploration
deviations being 0. For notational simplicity, we refer
to pˆi∗((t)) as pˆi∗(t). The following lemma shows that
{pˆi∗(t)}t≥0 converges to a limiting distribution with a
certain rate, and the support of the limiting distribution
is Λ∗.
Lemma 2 If Assumptions 1 - 2 hold and ei(t) = 0 for all
t and all i, then the sequence {pˆi∗(t)}t≥0 converges to the
limiting distribution pi∗ whose support is Λ∗ ⊆ diag(S ×
S). Moreover, the convergence rate could be quantified as:
||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗|| ≤ C||(t)||∞ for some constant C > 0.
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PROOF. The proof is divided into two claims.
Claim 1. The limiting distribution pi∗ , lim
t→∞ pˆi
∗(t)
exists, and its support is Λ∗ ⊆ diag(S × S).
PROOF. By Lemma 1, for any (t) ∈ (0, 1], the non-
zero entries of P (t) are polynomials of {i(t), 1− i(t)}
since ei(t) = 0 for all i ∈ V with time-homogeneous coef-
ficients. Then σz((t)) and
∑
z′∈Z
σz′((t)) are polynomials
of {i(t), 1− i(t)} with time-homogeneous coefficients.
Recall that i(t) = γi
c(t). For particular state z ∈ Z,
σz((t)) and
∑
z′∈Z
σz′((t)) are polynomials of 
c(t), and
pˆi∗z((t)) is a ratio of two polynomials of 
c(t):
pˆi∗z((t)) =
αz(
c(t))
β(c(t))
. (6)
In particular,
αz(
c(t)) = bzk
c(t)k + bzk+1
c(t)k+1 + · · ·+ bzhc(t)h
β(c(t)) = bk
c(t)k + bk+1
c(t)k+1 + · · ·+ bhc(t)h,
where k ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that
of bk is non-zero. When 
c(t) is sufficiently small, bzk
c(t)k
and bk
c(t)k dominate αz(
c(t))
β(c(t)) . Then the limit of the
pˆi∗z((t)) can be represented as pi
∗
z = lim
t→∞ pˆi
∗
z((t)) =
bzk
bk
.
Note that bzk and bk are also time-homogeneous.
By the definition of Λ∗, if bzk is non-zero, then z ∈ Λ∗;
And if bzk = 0, then z 6∈ Λ∗. We know pi∗z = b
z
k
bk
, therefore
the support of pi∗ is contained in Λ∗.
For any (t) ∈ (0, 1] Assume a state z = (s(0), s(1)) ∈
Λ((t)) but z 6∈ diag(S × S), i.e., s(0) 6= s(1), where
s(0) = (a1(0), · · · , aN (0)), s(1) = (a1(1), · · · , aN (1)).
Since z ∈ Λ((t)), then there is a tree Tmax((t))
rooted at z such that it has largest total proba-
bility. We construct a tree T ′ by adding the fol-
lowing path from z to z′ = (s(2), s(2)), where
zˆ = (s(1), s(2)), where s(2) = (a1(2), · · · , aN (2)) and
ai(2) = ai(arg max
τ∈{0,1}
{ui(s(τ))}),∀i:
z
P (t)(z,zˆ)−−−−−−→ zˆ P
(t)(zˆ,z′)−−−−−−−→ z′.
By Lemma 1, Vex(z, zˆ) = Vex(zˆ, z′) = V,Ver(z, zˆ) =
Ver(zˆ, z′) = ∅ and Vm(z, zˆ) = Vm(zˆ, z′) = ∅. So
P (t)(z, zˆ) =
∏
i∈V
(
(1− δi(s(0), s(1)))(1− i(t)) + i(t)|Ai|
)
and
P (t)(zˆ, z′) =
∏
i∈V
(
(1− δi(s(1), s(2)))(1− i(t)) + i(t)|Ai|
)
.
Let us consider the edge leaving z′:
z′
P (t)(z′,z′′)−−−−−−−→ zˆ′′ = (s(2), s(3)),
where s(3) = (a1(3), · · · , aN (3)) with at least one player
i such that ai(3) 6= ai(2). That is |Ver(z′, z′′)| ≥ 1. Then
the transition probability of the leaving edge satisfies:
P (t)(z′, z′′) =
∏
j∈Ver(z′,z′′)
j(t)
|Aj |∏
i∈Vex(z′,z′′)
(
(1− δi(s(2), s(2)))(1− i(t)) + i(t)|Ai|
)
.
By Assumption 1, δi(s, s
′) is non-negative constant
and independent of (t) for all i ∈ V and s, s′ ∈ S.
Then P (t)(z, zˆ), P (t)(zˆ, z′) and P (t)(z′, z′′) are dom-
inated by their lowest degree terms when (t) is suffi-
ciently small. In particular, the lowest degree terms of
P (t)(z, zˆ) and P (t)(zˆ, z′) are constant terms while the
lowest degree term P (t)(z′, z′′) is at least first-degree
term. Then there exists some ˆM ∈ (0, 1] such that
P (t)(z, zˆ)P (t)(zˆ, z′) > P (t)(z′, z′′),∀(t) ∈ (0, M ).
That is, the total probability of T ′ is larger than that
of Tmax((t)). We reach a contradiction. Therefore,
Λ∗ ⊆ diag(S × S) because Λ((t)) ⊆ diag(S × S) holds
for any sufficiently small (t). 2
Claim 2. ||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗|| ≤ C||(t)||∞ for some con-
stant C > 0.
PROOF. From Claim 1, we have lim
t→∞ pˆi
∗(t) = pi∗ and
the support of pi∗ is Λ∗. Now we consider the convergence
rate.
||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗|| =
∑
z∈Z
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |
=
∑
z∈Λ∗
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |+
∑
z 6∈Λ∗
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |
=
∑
z∈Λ∗
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |+
∑
z 6∈Λ∗
pˆi∗z((t))
=
∑
z∈Λ∗
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |+ 1−
∑
z∈Λ∗
pˆi∗z((t))
=
∑
z∈Λ∗
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |+
∑
z∈Λ∗
pi∗z −
∑
z∈Λ∗
pˆi∗z((t))
≤
∑
z∈Λ∗
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |+
∑
z∈Λ∗
|pˆi∗z((t))− pi∗z |
= 2
∑
z∈Λ∗
∣∣∣∣bzkc(t)k + · · ·+ bzhc(t)hbkc(t)k + · · ·+ bhc(t)h − b
z
k
bk
∣∣∣∣
= 2
∑
z∈Λ∗
∣∣∣∣Lz(c(t)k+1, · · · , c(t)h)L(c(t)k, · · · , c(t)h)
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+
c(t)k(bzkbk − bkbzk)
L(c(t)k, · · · , c(t)h)
∣∣∣∣
= 2c(t)
∑
z∈Λ∗
∣∣∣∣Lz(1, c(t), · · · , c(t)h−k−1)L(1, c(t), · · · , c(t)h−k)
∣∣∣∣ , (7)
where Lz and L are linear functions, the constant term
of L is non-zero. And by Assumption 2 - (1), for any
z ∈ Λ∗, Lz(1, c(t), a(t)h−k) and L(1, c(t), c(t)h−k−1)
converge as t→∞ because lim
t→∞ 
c(t) = 0. Also because
Λ∗ contains finite elements, then
2
∑
z∈Λ∗
∣∣∣Lz(1,c(t),··· ,c(t)h−k−1)L(1,c(t),··· ,c(t)h−k) ∣∣∣ is uniformly bounded. Re-
member that we fix i0 at the beginning. And we can al-
ways chooses a constant
C ≥ 2
∑
z∈Λ∗
∣∣∣Lz(1,c(t),··· ,c(t)h−k−1)L(1,c(t),··· ,c(t)h−k) ∣∣∣ such that ||pˆi∗(t) −
pi∗|| ≤ C||(t)||∞. It completes the proof of Claim 2. 2
The following lemma shows that the sequence {||pˆi∗(t)−
pˆi∗(t+1)||}t≥0 is summable and gives the explicit partial
sums of the sequence when t is large.
Lemma 3 If Assumptions 1 - 2 hold and ei(t) = 0 for all
t and all i, then
+∞∑
τ=0
||pˆi∗(τ)− pˆi∗(τ + 1)|| < +∞. More-
over, there exists a ti0 such that the partial sum satis-
fies
t∑
τ=ti
||pˆi∗(τ) − pˆi∗(τ + 1)|| ≤ 2||pˆi∗(ti0 + 1) − pi∗|| +
2||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗||,∀ti > ti0 and ∀t > ti.
PROOF. In this paper, for any vector, we choose the
L1-norm, then
+∞∑
τ=0
||pˆi∗(τ)− pˆi∗(τ + 1)||
=
+∞∑
τ=0
∑
z∈Z
|pˆi∗z((τ))− pˆi∗z((τ + 1))|. (8)
Recall equation (6), for any z ∈ Z, pˆi∗z((t)) = αz(
c(t))
β(c(t)) is
a ratio of two polynomials of c(t). Then the derivative
of pˆi∗z((t)) is:
∂pˆi∗z((t))
∂c(t)
=
1
β(c(t))
(
∂αz(
c(t))
∂c(t)
β(c(t))
−αz(c(t))∂β(
c(t))
∂c(t)
)
,
where ∂αz(
c(t))
∂c(t) β(
c(t))− αz(c(t))∂β(
c(t))
∂c(t) is a polyno-
mial of c(t). So
∂pˆi∗z (
c(t))
∂c(t) can be rewritten as
∂pˆi∗z((t))
∂c(t)
=
czl 
c(t)l + czl+1
c(t)l+1 + · · ·+ czhc(t)h
β(c(t))
,
where l ≥ 0, czl 6= 0 and β(c(t)) > 0. When c(t) is suf-
ficiently small, czl 
c(t)l dominates the derivative. There-
fore, ∃¯c > 0, such that the sign of ∂pˆi∗z ((t))∂c(t) is the sign of
czl , ∀0 < c(t) ≤ ¯c. By Assumption 2 - (1), c(t) strictly
decreases to 0, there exists a ti0 such that 
c(ti0) ≤ ¯c.
We can define a partition of Z as follows:
Z1 = {z ∈ Z|pˆi∗z((t)) > pˆi∗z((t+ 1)),∀t ≥ ti0}
Z2 = {z ∈ Z|pˆi∗z((t)) < pˆi∗z((t+ 1)),∀t ≥ ti0}.
Then equality (8) becomes:
+∞∑
τ=0
||pˆi∗(τ)− pˆi∗(τ + 1)||
=
ti0∑
τ=0
∑
z∈Z
|pˆi∗z((τ))− pˆi∗z((τ + 1))|
+
+∞∑
τ=ti0+1
∑
z∈Z1
(pˆi∗z((τ))− pˆi∗z((τ + 1)))
+
+∞∑
τ=ti0+1
(1−
∑
z∈Z1
pˆi∗z((τ + 1))− (1−
∑
z∈Z1
pˆi∗z((τ))))
=
ti0∑
τ=0
∑
z∈Z
|pˆi∗z((τ))− pˆi∗z((τ + 1))|
+ 2
∑
z∈Z1
(pˆi∗z((t
i0 + 1))− pˆi∗z(0)) < +∞. (9)
Now we consider the partial sum
t∑
τ=ti
||pˆi∗(τ)− pˆi∗(τ + 1)||
when ti > ti0 and t > ti. By equality (9), we have:
t∑
τ=ti
||pˆi∗(τ)− pˆi∗(τ + 1)||
≤ 2
∑
z∈Z
|pˆi∗z((ti + 1))− pi∗z + pi∗z − pˆi∗z((t))|
≤ 2 ∣∣∣∣pˆi∗(ti + 1)− pi∗∣∣∣∣+ 2 ||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗|| .
2
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2 shows that pˆi∗(t) → pi∗ whose support is Λ∗.
Now we proceed to finish the proofs of Theorem 1 by
showing pi(t)→ pi∗ and quantifying its convergence rate.
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PROOF. Based on triangle inequality, we can get for
any t ≥ 2,
||pi(t)− pi∗|| ≤ ||pi(t)− pˆi(t)||+ ||pˆi(t)− pi∗||. (10)
We want to prove that the two terms in the right-hand
side of (10) converge to 0 with certain rates.
Claim 3. lim
t→∞ ||pˆi(t)− pi
∗|| = 0 and there exists
some t∨ such that for any t∗3 > t
∨ and t >
t∗3 + 1, ||pˆi(t)− pi∗|| ≤ Cq exp
(
−
t−1∑
τ=t∗3
N∏
i=1
i(t)|Ai|
)
+
4C||(t∗3)||∞ + C||(t)||∞ for some constants
C, Cq > 0.
PROOF. Based on triangle inequality, we can get for
all t ≥ 2,
||pˆi(t)− pi∗|| ≤ ||pˆi(t)− pˆi∗(t)||+ ||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗|| , (11)
where pˆi(t) is the distribution on Z at t when the ex-
ploration deviations ei(t) = 0 for all i ∈ V. Let x(t) ,
||pˆi(t)− pˆi∗(t)|| and y(t) , ||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗||.
Let us first consider x(t). Note that pˆi∗(t)TP (t) =
pˆi∗(t)T . Then we have:
x(t) = ||pˆi(t)− pˆi∗(t)||
= ||pˆi(t)− pˆi∗(t− 1) + pˆi∗(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t)||
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣{P (t−1)}T pˆi(t− 1)− {P (t−1)}T pˆi∗(t− 1)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ ||pˆi∗(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t)|| . (12)
By (4) in the proof of Lemma 1, the nonzero entries in
{P (t−1)}T can be represented as polynomials of {i(t−
1), 1 − i(t − 1)}. Taking the nonzero entry
N∏
i=1
i(t−1)
|Ai| ,
we can decompose {P (t−1)}T into the following:
{P (t−1)}T =
N∏
i=1
i(t− 1)
|Ai| Q+R(t− 1),
where Q is a |Z| × |Z| matrix with all entries are 1. Be-
cause P (t−1) is a transition matrix, then the {P (t−1)}T
is a column stochastic matrix where each column
sum is equal to 1. It follows that the column sums of
N∏
i=1
i(t−1)
|Ai| Q equal
N∏
i=1
i(t−1)
|Ai| |Z| =
N∏
i=1
i(t− 1)|Ai| since
|Z| =
(
N∏
i=1
|Ai|
)2
, and the column sums of R(t − 1)
equal c(t− 1) = 1−
N∏
i=1
i(t− 1)|Ai|.
By (1) in Assumption 2,
N∏
i=1
i(t − 1)|Ai| strictly de-
creases to 0. Then there exists a t|A| such that
N∏
i=1
i(t−
1)|Ai| < 1 for all t ≥ t|A|, which implies 0 < c(t−1) < 1
for all t ≥ t|A| and the column sums of c(t−1)−1R(t−1)
equal 1. Let v(t − 1) , ||pˆi∗(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t)||. And con-
sider t ≥ t|A|, then inequality (12) becomes:
x(t) ≤ ||{P (t−1)}T (pˆi(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t− 1))||+ v(t− 1)
= ||
N∏
i=1
i(t− 1)
|Ai| Q(pˆi(t− 1)− pˆi
∗(t− 1))
+R(t− 1)(pˆi(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t− 1))||+ v(t− 1), (13)
where pˆi(t − 1) and pˆi∗(t − 1) are both stochastic vec-
tors whose sum of elements is equal to one. And by the
construction of Q, we have Q(pˆi(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t− 1)) = 0.
Then inequality (13) becomes:
x(t) ≤ c(t− 1)||c(t− 1)−1R(t− 1)
× (pˆi(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t− 1))||+ v(t− 1)
≤ c(t− 1)||c(t− 1)−1R(t− 1)||
× ||pˆi(t− 1)− pˆi∗(t− 1)||+ v(t− 1)
= c(t− 1)x(t− 1) + v(t− 1),
where c(t − 1) ∈ (0, 1) for all t ≥ t|A|. With inequality
log(1 − x) < −x, ∀x ∈ (0, 1), for any t > t|A| and t∗3 ≥
t|A|, we have :
x(t) ≤ c(t− 1)x(t− 1) + v(t− 1)
≤
t−1∏
τ=t∗3
c(τ)x(t∗3) + v(t− 1) +
t−2∑
τ=t∗3
(
t−1∏
i=τ+1
c(i)v(τ)
)
≤ x(t∗3)
t−1∏
τ=t∗3
exp (−(1− c(τ))) + v(t− 1)
+
t−2∑
τ=t∗3
(
t−1∏
i=τ+1
exp (−(1− c(i))) v(τ)
)
≤ x(t∗3) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗3
(1− c(τ))
+ t−1∑
τ=t∗3
v(τ). (14)
Note that inequality (14) holds for any t∗3 ≥ t|A|. And
by Lemma 3, v(τ) is summable, we first take the limit
of t and then take the limit of t∗3, by the summability
of v(τ), we can have lim
t∗3→∞
lim
t→∞
t−1∑
τ=t∗3
v(τ) = 0. And for
any ti > ti0 and t > ti,
t∑
τ=ti
||pˆi∗(τ) − pˆi∗(τ + 1)|| ≤
2||pˆi∗(ti + 1)− pi∗||+ 2||pˆi∗(t)− pi∗||.
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Let t∨ , max{ti0 , t|A|}. Since Inequality (14) holds for
any t∗3 ≥ t|A|, we can take t∗3 > t∨. Recall that 1 −
c(τ) =
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai|, then for any t > t∗3, inequality (14)
becomes:
x(t) ≤ x(t∗3) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗3
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai|

+ 2||pˆi∗(t∗3 + 1)− pi∗||+ 2||pˆi∗(t− 1)− pi∗||
= x(t∗3) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗3
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai|

+ 2y(t∗3 + 1) + 2y(t− 1). (15)
Combining inequalities (11) and (15), we can get for any
t∗3 > t
∨:
||pˆi(t)− pi∗|| ≤ x(t∗3) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗3
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai|

+ 2y(t∗3 + 1) + 2y(t− 1) + y(t). (16)
By (2) in Assumption 2,
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai| is not summable.
Therefore, for any t∗3 > t
∨, we have
lim
t→∞x(t
∗
3) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗3
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai|
 = 0.
By Lemma 2, we have
2y(t∗3 + 1) + 2y(t− 1) + y(t)
≤ 2C||(t∗3 + 1)||∞ + 2C|(t− 1)∞ + C||(t)||∞
≤ 4C||(t∗3)||∞ + C||(t)||∞,
where 2C||(t∗3)+1||∞+2C||(t−1)||∞ ≤ 4C||(t∗3)||∞
since i(t) is strictly decreasing to 0. And there exists a
positive constant Cq such that x(t
∗
3) ≤ Cq. Therefore,
for any t∗3 > t
∨ and t > t∗3 + 1, (16) becomes:
||pˆi(t)− pi∗|| ≤ Cq exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗3
N∏
i=1
i(τ)|Ai|

+ 4C||(t∗3)||∞ + C||(t)||∞.
Therefore we reach Claim 3. 2
Claim 4. lim
t→∞ ||pi(t) − pˆi(t)|| = 0 and there exists
some tc such that for any t∗4 ≥ tc + 1 and t ≥ t∗4,
||pi(t) − pˆi(t)|| ≤ Cc exp(−
t−1∑
τ=t∗4
N∏
i=1
˜i(τ)|Ai|) + 4Ner(t∗4)
for some constant Cc > 0.
PROOF. Based on triangle inequality, we can get for
all t ≥ 2,
||pi(t)− pˆi(t)|| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣pi(t)− {P ˜(t−1)}T pˆi(t− 1)∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣{P ˜(t−1)}T pˆi(t− 1)− pˆi(t)∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (17)
With pi(t) = {P ˜(t−1)}Tpi(t− 1) and pˆi(t) = {P (t−1)}T
pˆi(t− 1), (17) becomes:
||pi(t)− pˆi(t)|| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣{P ˜(t−1)}T (pi(t− 1)− pˆi(t− 1))∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣({P ˜(t−1)}T − {P (t−1)}T) pˆi(t− 1)∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (18)
Based on Lemma 1, the nonzero entries in {P ˜(t−1)}T
can be represented as polynomials of {˜i(t−1), 1− ˜i(t−
1)}. Taking the nonzero entry
N∏
i=1
˜i(t−1)
|Ai| , we can de-
compose {P ˜(t−1)}T into the following: {P ˜(t−1)}T =
N∏
i=1
˜i(t−1)
|Ai| Q + R
′(t − 1), where Q is a |Z| × |Z| matrix
with all entries are 1. Because P ˜(t−1) is a transition
matrix, then the {P ˜(t−1)}T is a column stochastic ma-
trix where each column sum is equal to 1. It follows that
the column sums of
N∏
i=1
˜i(t−1)
|Ai| Q equal
N∏
i=1
˜i(t−1)
|Ai| |Z| =
N∏
i=1
˜i(t− 1)|Ai|, and the column sums of R′(t− 1) equal
c(t− 1) = 1−
N∏
i=1
˜i(t− 1)|Ai|.
Let x(t) = ||pi(t)− pˆi(t)||. And by the structure of Q and
the fact that pi(t − 1) and pˆi(t − 1) are both stochastic
vectors whose sum of elements is equal to 1, we have
Q(pi(t− 1)− pˆi(t− 1)) = 0. Then (18) becomes:
x(t) ≤ ||R′(t− 1)(pi(t− 1)− pˆi(t− 1))||
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣({P ˜(t−1)}T − {P (t−1)}T) pˆi(t− 1)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c(t− 1)x(t− 1) +
∣∣∣∣∣∣{P ˜(t−1)}T − {P (t−1)}T ∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(19)
By (4) in the proof of Lemma 1, any entry in P ˜(t−1) can
be represented as a summation of at most 2N polyno-
mials. And each polynomial is a product of N monomi-
als; e.g.,
N∏
i=1
˜i(t−1)
|Ai| . And the entries in P
(t−1) have the
same form with ˜i(t−1) = i(t−1). Then the difference
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of any pair of entries (P ˜(t−1)(x, y), P (t−1)(x, y)) has at
most 4N terms (for example,
N∏
i=1
˜i(t−1)
|Ai| −
N∏
i=1
i(t−1)
|Ai| has
2N −1 terms). And each term is less than
N∏
i=1
||e(t−1)||∞
|Ai| ,
where ||e(t)||∞ = max{|e1c(t)|, · · · , |eNc (t)|}. Then any
pair of entries (P ˜(t−1)(x, y), P (t−1)(x, y)) satisfy that:
|P ˜(t−1)(x, y)− P (t−1)(x, y)| ≤ 4N
N∏
i=1
1
|Ai| ||e(t− 1)||∞.
Then (19) becomes:
x(t) ≤ c(t− 1)x(t− 1) + 4N ||e(t− 1)||N∞
N∏
i=1
|Ai|. (20)
Let χ(t) = x(t) −
4N ||e(t)||N∞
N∏
i=1
|Ai|
1−c(t) = x(t) − 4Ner(t).
Then from (20), we can get:
χ(t) ≤ c(t− 1)χ(t− 1) + 4Ner(t− 1)− 4Ner(t). (21)
Inequality (21) holds for any t ≥ 2. Recall that ˜i(t) ∈
(0, 1],∀i ∈ V,∀t, then c(t − 1) ≤ 1. By simple alge-
braic operations, we have c(t − 1) ≥ 1 −
N∏
i=1
(i(t −
1) + ||e(t − 1)||∞)|Ai|. And by (1) and (3) in Assump-
tion 2,
N∏
i=1
(i(t−1)+ ||e(t−1)||∞) converges to 0. There-
fore, there exists a tc such that
N∏
i=1
(i(t − 1) + ||e(t −
1)||∞)|Ai| < 1,∀t ≥ tc + 1. Then c(t − 1) ∈ (0, 1),∀t ≥
tc+1. By manipulating inequality log(1−x) < −x, ∀x ∈
(0, 1) and exp(−x) < 1,∀x > 0, (21) can be rewritten
for all t∗4 ≥ tc + 1 and t ≥ t∗4 as follows:
χ(t) ≤
t−1∏
τ=t∗4
c(τ)χ(t∗4) + 4
Ner(t− 1)− 4Ner(t)
+
t−2∑
τ=t∗4
 t−1∏
j=τ+1
c(j)
 4N (er(τ)− er(τ + 1))
≤ χ(t∗4) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗4
(1− c(τ))

+
t−1∑
τ=t∗4
4N (er(τ)− er(τ + 1))
≤ χ(t∗4) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗4
(1− c(τ))
+ 4N (er(t∗4)− er(t)).
Plug χ(t) = x(t) − 4Ner(t) and c(t) = 1 −
N∏
i=1
˜i(t)|Ai|
in the above inequality, and we have:
x(t) ≤ χ(t∗4) exp
− t−1∑
τ=t∗4
N∏
i=1
˜i(τ)|Ai|
+ 4Ner(t∗4).
(22)
By Assumption 2 - (2),
N∏
i=1
˜i(τ)|Ai| is not summable.
Therefore, lim
t→∞χ(t
∗
4) exp
(
−
t−1∑
τ=t∗4
N∏
i=1
˜i(τ)|Ai|
)
= 0.
And by Assumption 2 - (3), lim
t∗4→∞
4Ner(t
∗
4) = 0. We
first take the limit of t and then take the limit of t∗4, we
can have lim
t∗4→∞
lim
t→∞χ(t
∗
4) exp
(
−
t−1∑
τ=t∗4
N∏
i=1
˜i(τ)|Ai|
)
+
4Ner(t
∗
4) = 0. And there exists a positive constant Cc
such that χ(t∗4) ≤ Cc. Then for t∗4 ≥ tc + 1 and t ≥ t∗4:
||pi(t)− pˆi(t)|| ≤ Cc exp(−
t−1∑
τ=t∗4
N∏
i=1
˜i(τ)|Ai|) + 4Ner(t∗4).
Therefore we reach Claim 4. 2
Combining Claim 3 and Claim 4, we get that for
Markov chain M, its state distribution {pi(t)} con-
verges to limiting distribution pi∗. Moreover, by triangle
inequality, Claim 3 and Claim 4, there exists some
tmin = max{t∨, tc} and C ≥ max{Cq, 4C, Cc, 4N},
such that for any t∗ > tmin and t > t∗+1, inequality (1)
holds. It completes the proof of Theorem 1. 2
5.4 Proof of Corollary 2
PROOF. From the last two paragraph of Section 5.3,
the constant C in inequality (1) can be estimated as
C ≥ max{Cq, 4C, Cc, 4N}. Now we will prove that
there exists a set of feasible constants Cq, 4C, Cc such
that max{|Z|, 4N , 32N |Z||Z|+4(N + 1)|Z|2N |Z|CmaxCmin } ≥
max{Cq, 4C, Cc, 4N}.
From Claim 3, Cq can be any constant that satisfies
Cq ≥ ||pˆi(t∗3)− pˆi∗(t∗3)|| =
∑
z∈Z
|pˆiz((t∗3)) − pˆi∗z((t∗3))|.
Since pˆiz((t
∗
3)) ∈ [0, 1] and pˆi∗z((t∗3)) ∈ [0, 1]. Cq
can be Cq = |Z| ≥ ||pˆi(t∗3)− pˆi∗(t∗3)||. And from
Claim 4, Cc can be any constant that satisfies
Cc ≥ χ(t∗4) = ||pi(t∗4)− pˆi(t∗4)|| − 4Ner(t∗4). Here,||pi(t∗4)− pˆi(t∗4)|| − 4Ner(t∗4) ≤ ||pi(t∗4)− pˆi(t∗4)|| ≤
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∑
z∈Z
|piz((t∗4)) − pˆiz((t∗4))| ≤ |Z|. Then Cc can be
Cc = |Z|.
From Claim 2, C can be any constant that satisfies
C ≥ 2
∑
z∈Λ∗
|Lz(1,c(t),··· ,c(t)h−k−1)
L(1,c(t),··· ,c(t)h−k) | = C. And by (7),
we have:
C = 2
∑
z∈Λ∗
1
c(t)
∣∣∣∣bzkc(t)k + · · ·+ bzhc(t)hbkc(t)k + · · ·+ bhc(t)h − b
z
k
bk
∣∣∣∣
= 2
∑
z∈Λ∗
∣∣∣∣∣bk(bzk+1c(t)k + · · ·+ bzhc(t)h−1)bk(bkc(t)k + · · ·+ bhc(t)h)
−b
z
k(bk+1
c(t)k + · · ·+ bhc(t)h−1)
bk(bkc(t)k + · · ·+ bhc(t)h)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
∑
z∈Z
(∣∣∣∣ |bzk+1|+ · · ·+ |bzh|bk + · · ·+ bhc(t)h−k
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣ |bk+1|+ · · ·+ |bh|bk + · · ·+ bhc(t)h−k
∣∣∣∣) , (23)
where we use |c(t) ≤ | ≤ 1 in the inequality. Based on
equalities (5) and (6), we have the following relation:
bzk
c(t)k + · · ·+ bzhc(t)h = σz((t))
=
∑
T∈G(t)(z)
∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
P (t)(x, y). (24)
Here we assume wi(t) = 0,∀i ∈ Vt ≥ 0. Then the mis-
exploitations happen with probability 0. So
P (t)(x, y) =
∏
i∈Ver(x,y)
γi
c(t)
|Ai|
×
∏
j∈Vex(x,y)
(1 + (−γj + γj|Aj | )
c(t)). (25)
So P (t)(x, y) is a polynomial of c(t) and can be
written as P (t)(x, y) = d0(x, y) + d1(x, y)
c(t) +
· · · + dN (x, y)c(t)N . Note that some coefficient
dm(x, y) could be 0. Denote by dˆ(x, y) the coeffi-
cient of the least degree term in P (t)(x, y). In fact,
coefficients bzk, · · · bzh, bk, · · · , bh consists of dm(x, y),
where m ∈ {0, · · · , N}. In Claim 5, we will first find
an upper bound of |dm(x, y)| and a lower bound of
|dˆ(x, y)|. In Claims 6 and 7, we will estimate the last
sum in inequality (23) by finding an upper bound of
|bzk+1| + · · · + |bzh| and |bk+1| + · · · + |bh| and a lower
bound of |bk + · · ·+ bhc(t)h−k|.
Claim 5. For any x, y ∈ Z and m ∈ {0, · · · , N},
|dm(x, y)| ≤ 2N max{1, ||γ||N∞}. And for any x, y ∈ Z,
dˆ(x, y) ≥ min{( |γ|min|A|∞ )N , 1}.
PROOF. Expanding the right hand side of (25) yields
the sum of at most 2N monomials where each monomial
is a product of
∏
i∈Ver(x,y)
γi
c(t)
|Ai| , 1 and (−γj +
γj
|Aj | )
c(t).
dm(x, y) =
∑
{V′(x,y)⊆Vex(x,y)||Ver(x,y)|+|V′(x,y)|=m} ∏
i∈Ver(x,y)
γi
|Ai|
∏
j∈V′(x,y)
(−γj + γj|Aj | )
 ,
And there are
( |Vex(x,y)|
m−|Ver(x,y)|
)
choices of V ′(x, y).
Since |Vex(x, y)| ≤ N here we use the upper bound( |Vex(x,y)|
m−|Ver(x,y)|
) ≤ ( Nm−|Ver(x,y)|) ≤ 2N for presentation
simplicity. Note that ||γ||∞ = max
i∈V
γi, then
γi
|Ai| < ||γ||∞
and |−γj + γj|Aj | | ≤ ||γ||∞. Then for all m ∈ {0, · · · , N},
|dm(x, y)| ≤
∑
|Ver(x,y)|+|V′ex(x,y)|=m
(max{1, ||γ||∞})m
≤ 2N max{1, ||γ||N∞}.
By equality (25), dˆ(x, y) =
∏
i∈Ver(x,y)
γi
|Ai| when
Ver(x, y) 6= ∅ or dˆ(x, y) = 1 when Ver(x, y) = ∅. Note
that, dˆ(x, y) > 0 for any x, y ∈ Z. With γi|Ai| ≥
|γ|min
|A|∞ ,
dˆ(x, y) ≥ min{( |γ|min|A|∞ )N , 1}. 2
Claim 6. |bzk+1| + · · · + |bzh| and |bk+1| + · · · + |bh|
are both upper bounded by N |Z||Z|+3(N +
1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax.
PROOF. Notice that∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
P (t)(x, y)
=
∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
(d0(x, y) + · · ·+ dN (x, y)c(t)N )
= fT0 + f
T
1 
c(t) + · · ·+ fTN |T |c(t)N |T |, (26)
where |T | is the number of edges of tree T . For
the analytical simplicity, denote the enumeration of
edges in T as E(T ) = {g1, g2, · · · , g|T |} and denote
by dlg (g) the coefficient of the lg-th degree term in
the polynomial P (t)(x, y), where lg ∈ {0, · · · , N}.
Then
∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
(d0(x, y) + · · · + dN (x, y)c(t)N ) =
g|T |∏
g=g1
(d0(g) + · · · + dN (g)c(t)N ), which can be ex-
panded as the sum of (N + 1)|T | monomials where
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each monomial is in the form of
g|T |∏
g=g1
dlg (g)
c(t)lg .
Then fTm =
∑
{lg1 ,··· ,lg|T | |lg1+···+lg|T |=m}
(
g|T |∏
g=g1
dlg (g)
)
,
where m ∈ {0, · · · , N |T |}. Finding combinations of
(lg1 , · · · , lg|T |) such that lg1 + · · ·+ lg|T | = m can be cast
to the problem of obtaining m points on |T | N + 1-sided
dice (pages 23-24 in Uspensky (1937)). The number of
all possible combinations equals the coefficient of c(t)m
in the polynomial (
N∑
i=0
c(t)i)|T |. By generalizing the so-
lution of problem 13 in Uspensky (1937), we can get the
coefficient of c(t)m is
b mN+1 c∑
i=0
(−1)i(|T |i )(|T |+m−(N+1)i−1m−(N+1)i ),
where b·c is the floor function. And by multino-
mial theorem (Section 24.1.2 in Abramowitz and
Stegun (1964)), the summation of all coefficients in
(
N∑
i=0
c(t)i)|T | equals (N + 1)|T |. Combining Claim 5, we
have |fTm| ≤ (N + 1)|T |(2N max{1, ||γ||N∞})|T |.
Note that any tree T ∈ G(t)(z) is a spanning tree of
the graph G((t)) where each vertex is a state z ∈ Z.
Then |T | = |Z| − 1 ≤ |Z|. Therefore, |fTm| ≤ (N +
1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax.
By Cayley’s formula Cayley (1889), there are |Z||Z|−2
spanning trees on the complete graph with each
vertex being a state z ∈ Z. From (24) and (26),
bzm =
∑
T∈G(t)(z)
fTm. With |Z||Z|−2 ≤ |Z||Z|, for all
m ∈ {k, · · · , h}, it holds that |bzm| ≤
∑
T∈G(t)(z)
|fTm| ≤
|Z||Z|(N + 1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax.
Based on equalities (5), (6) and (24), we have:
bk
c(t)k + · · ·+ bhc(t)h =
∑
z∈Z
σz((t))
=
∑
z∈Z
bzk
c(t)k + · · ·+
∑
z∈Z
bzh
c(t)h. (27)
Therefore, |bm| ≤
∑
z∈Z
|bzm| ≤ |Z||Z|+1(N + 1)|Z|2N |Z|
Cmax,∀m ∈ {k, · · · , h}. By equality (26) and |T | ≤ |Z|,
the largest degree of
∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
P (t)(x, y) is less than
N |Z|, hence h ≤ N |Z|. Then |bzk+1| + · · · + |bzh| and
|bk+1| + · · · + |bh| have less than N |Z| terms, which
implies that |bzk+1| + · · · + |bzh| ≤ N |Z||Z|+3(N +
1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax and |bk+1|+ · · ·+ |bh| ≤ N |Z||Z|+3(N+
1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax. 2
Claim 7. |bk + bk+1c(t) + · · · + bhc(t)h−k| ≥
1
2Cmin when ||˜(t)||∞ ≤ Cmin/2(N |Z||Z|+3(N +
1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax).
PROOF. Now let us consider the magnitude of
the coefficient of the least degree term in σz((t));
i.e., |bzk|. Denote by fˆT the coefficient of the least
degree term in
∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
P (t)(x, y). From equality
(24), fˆT =
∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
dˆ(x, y). By Claim 5, for any
T ∈ G(t)(z), fˆT ≥ min{
∏
(x,y)∈E(T )
( |γ|min|A|∞ )
N , 1} ≥ Cmin
because |T | ≤ |Z|. Then bzk ≥ fˆT ≥ Cmin.
From equality (27), we have bk =
∑
z∈Z
bzk. Since b
z
k is
positive, bk ≥ bzk. When
||˜(t)||∞ ≤ Cmin/2(N |Z||Z|+3(N + 1)|Z|2N |Z|Cmax),
|bk+1c(t) + · · · + bhc(t)h−k| ≤ 12Cmin and |bk + · · · +
bh
c(t)h−k| ≥ 12Cmin. 2
Combining Claim 6 and Claim 7, (23) becomes C ≤
C. 2
6 Case studies
In this section, we will evaluate the RL algorithm us-
ing two applications; i.e., the demand allocation market
in Zhu (2014) and the cyber security scenario in Okhravi
et al. (2014).
6.1 Case 1: Demand allocation market
In this section, we study a power market which consists
of N customers and a system operator. Each customer
wants to allocate its demands in near future time slots
and its action is subject to a price enforced by the system
operator.
6.1.1 System components
Customers. We consider N customers V = {1, · · · , N}
and each customer i ∈ V has power demands xi ≥ 0 and
wants to allocate its demands in one time slot within
Ai = {1, 2, · · · , |Ai|}. The action ai ∈ Ai is the time slot
chosen by customer i. Each customer wants to satisfy
its demands as soon as possible so it punishes late allo-
cation. The cost function ci : Ai → R is not decreasing;
i.e., ci(a
i) ≤ ci(aˆi) if aˆi > ai.
System operator. The system operator charges
each customer some price based on demand dis-
tributions. In particular, given an action profile
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Fig. 2. Temporal aggregate demands allocated at ten time
slots with diminishing exploration rate i(t) =
1
10
t−
0.25
100 .
s = (a1, · · · , aN ), the total demand allocated in time
slot ai is Ξai(s) ,
∑
j∈V
1{aj=ai}xj , where 1{Π} is an in-
dicator function: 1{Π} = 1 if Π is true and 1{Π} = 0 if
Π is false. The system operator charges customer i the
price pa(Ξai(s)).
Utility. The utility of customer i is the negative of the
cost and price: ui(s) = −ci(ai)− pa(Ξai(s)).
Informational constraint. Each customer is unwill-
ing to share its cost function ci and private action a
i
with other customers and the system operator. And the
system operator does not want to disclose the pricing
policy to the customers and only agrees to publicize the
price value pa(s) given s. Therefore, each customer only
knows its own utility values instead of the structure of
the utility function.
6.1.2 Evaluation
Evaluation setup. In this section, we use Matlab simu-
lations to evaluate the performance of the RL algorithm.
Similar to the setup in Zhu (2014), we consider 100 cus-
tomers and they have identical action sets consisting of
10 time slots. The demands of all customers are 1; i.e.,
xi = 1 for any i ∈ V. The cost function for customer i is
set as ci(a
i) = ρiξ
ai
i , where ρi > 0 and ξi > 1. And the
pricing mechanism is pa(Ξai(s)) = Ξai(s).
Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 2.1 in Zhu (2014), we
know that the demand allocation game under the above
setup is a potential game, and then a weakly acyclic
game Monderer and Shapley (1996). Therefore the exis-
tence of pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed.
Simulation results with diminishing exploration
rates. As discussed in Section 4.4, we restrict the explo-
ration rates to be p-series. In particular, Figures 2 - 4
show the evaluations of the RL algorithm for three cases
i(t) =
1
10 t
− 0.25100 , i(t) = 110 t
− 0.5100 and i(t) = 110 t
− 1100
Fig. 3. Temporal aggregate demands allocated at ten time
slots with diminishing exploration rate i(t) =
1
10
t−
0.5
100 .
Fig. 4. Temporal aggregate demands allocated at ten time
slots with diminishing exploration rate i(t) =
1
10
t−
1
100 .
(the optimal one), respectively. The exploration devia-
tions are chosen as ei(t) =
9
10t2 and the measurement
noises are absent; i.e., wi(t) = 0. The duration of the
simulation is 2,000 iterations. The simulation results
confirm the convergence of the action profiles in Theo-
rem 1. In addition, the convergence in Figure 4 is fastest
where the optimal exploration rates i(t) =
1
10 t
− 1100
are adopted. It is consistent with the discussion in Sec-
tion 4.4.
Simulation results with measurement errors. In
this part, we evaluate how the RL algorithm performs
when the measurement noises are present. The explo-
ration rates are chosen as i(t) =
1
10 t
− 1100 and the explo-
ration deviations are chosen as ei(t) =
9
10t2 . The mea-
surement noises are chosen as uniformly distributed over
two different intervals [−10, 10] and [−20, 20], respec-
tively. Compared with Figure 4, Figures 5 - 6 show that
the action profiles slow down and oscillate with larger
magnitudes when the noise magnitude increases. In ad-
dition, we also evaluate how the RL algorithm performs
when Assumption 1 is violated. In particular, wi(t) is
uniformly distributed over the time-dependent interval
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[−10 log(t), 10 log(t)]. The result shown in Figures 7 im-
plies that the action profiles do not converge anymore.
Fig. 5. Temporal aggregate demands allocated at ten time
slots with uniformly distributed measurement noises in the
interval [−10, 10].
Fig. 6. Temporal aggregate demands allocated at ten time
slots with uniformly distributed measurement noises in the
interval [−20, 20].
Matlab simulation results with fixed exploration
rates. Figures 8 shows the evaluation of the RL algo-
rithm with fixed exploration rates i(t) =
1
10
− 1100 . The
exploration deviations are chosen as ei(t) =
9
10t2 and the
measurement noises are absent; i.e., wi(t) = 0. The com-
parison of Figures 4 and 8 shows that fixed exploration
rates cause larger oscillations in steady state.
6.2 Case 2: Adaptive cyber defense scenario
In this section, we study a real-world cyber security sce-
nario which consists of two players: the defender and at-
tacker. The system is the server containing several zero-
day security vulnerabilities. A zero-day attack happens
once that a software/hardware vulnerability is exploited
by the attacker before software the engineers develop any
patch to fix the vulnerability. The attacker is equipped
with a set of zero-day attack scripts denoted as A and
the defender is equipped with a set of platforms denoted
Fig. 7. Temporal aggregate demands allocated at ten time
slots with uniformly distributed measurement noises in the
interval [−10 ln(t), 10 ln(t)].
Fig. 8. Temporal aggregate demands allocated at ten time
slots with fixed exploration rates i(t) =
1
10
− 1
100 .
as D. The defender uses a defensive technique called dy-
namic platforms Okhravi et al. (2014), which changes
the properties of the server such that it is harder for the
attacker to succeed. The components in the cyber secu-
rity scenario and the interactions among the components
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
6.2.1 System components
Defender. The defender has a set of different platforms;
e.g., different versions of operating systems and archi-
tectures. The defender periodically restarts the server,
chooses one platform fromD and deploys it on the server
each time it restarts the server. The iteration denoted
in Section 2.1 is the defense period in this scenario. The
action d(t) is the platform deployed at iteration t.
Attacker. The attacker has a set of zero-day attack
scripts, where each attack script can only succeed on
some platforms, but no the others. The attacker peri-
odically chooses one of the attack scripts to attack the
server. Notice that the attack period is often smaller than
the defense period because the defender cannot restart
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Table 1. Utility table
Defense actions
Attack actions
(0,10) (1,9) (2,8) (3,7) (4,6) (5,5) (6,4) (7,3) (8,2) (9,1) (10,0)
d1(Fedora 11) 0,1.0 0.1,0.9 0.2,0.8 0.3,0.7 0.4,0.6 0.5,0.5 0.6,0.4 0.7,0.3 0.8,0.2 0.9,0.1 1.0,0
d2(Gentoo 9) 1.0,0 0.9,0.1 0.8,0.2 0.7,0.3 0.6,0.4 0.5,0.5 0.4,0.6 0.3,0.7 0.2,0.8 0.1,0.9 0,1.0
d3(CentOS 6.3) 0,1.0 0.1,0.9 0.2,0.8 0.3,0.7 0.4,0.6 0.5,0.5 0.6,0.4 0.7,0.3 0.8,0.2 0.9,0.1 1.0,0
d4(Debian 6) 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0
d5(FreeBSD 9) 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0 1.0,0
the server too frequently due to the resource consump-
tion of restarting the server. In fact, the defense period
is usually a multiple of the attack period. The attack
action at iteration t, denoted as a(t), is a subset of the
attack scripts and the attack action set A includes all
possible subsets. The order of choosing the attack scripts
in one iteration does not matter.
Server. Once an attack action succeeds, the attacker
can control the server for a certain amount of time. And
every time the server restarts, the defender takes over
the control of the server. And here we assume the time
consumed by the attack scripts to succeed and the time
consumed by restarting the server are negligible com-
pared with the length of an iteration.
Utility. The goal of both the attacker and defender is
to gain longer control time of the server. The utility of
the defender ud(d(t), a(t)) is the fraction of the time con-
trolled by the defender during iteration t and the utility
of the attacker ua(d(t), a(t)) is the fraction of the time
controlled by the attacker. Notice that ud(d(t), a(t)) +
ua(d(t), a(t)) = 1.
Informational constraint. The attacker can observe
when the server restarts, so it knows the iterations, but
it does not know the defender’s action set D and which
platform is deployed. The defender does not know the
attacker’s action set A and the specific attack scripts
chosen by the attacker. At the end of each defense period,
both the defender and attacker can measure how much
time they control the server. Therefore, each player only
knows its own utility values instead of the structure of
the utility function.
6.2.2 Evaluation
Evaluation setup. In this section, we use Matlab sim-
ulations to evaluate the performance of our algorithm
based on real-world platform settings, attack scripts and
server control data (Okhravi et al., 2012, 2014). The
total number of defense actions is 5; i.e., the defender
has five different platforms: Fedora 11 on x86, Gentoo 9
on x86, Debian 6 on x86, FreeBSD 9 on x86, and Cen-
tOS 6.3 on x86. The attacker has two zero-day attack
scripts: TCP MAXSEG exploit, and Socket Pairs ex-
ploit. The defense period is set to be ten times as large
as the attack period; i.e., during one iteration, the at-
tacker launches 10 attack scripts. Since the time con-
sumed by the attack scripts to succeed is negligible, one
attack script enables the attacker control 110 of the iter-
ation if it succeeds. The total number of attack actions
is 11; i.e., a1 = (0, 10), a2 = (1, 9), · · · , a11 = (10, 0),
where a(t) = (0, 10) means the attacker launches 0 TCP
MAXSEG exploit and 10 Socket Pairs exploits at itera-
tion t.
Real-world utility values. Based on the evaluation
setup and the real-world attack scripts, we first replay
different attack actions on different platforms to get the
utility table for the defender and the attacker. The re-
sults are shown in Table 1, where the defender is the row
player and the attacker is the column player. In each
cell, the first number represents the utility value to the
defender, and the second number represents the utility
value to the attacker.
Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 1 in Takahashi and
Yamamori (2002), we know any 2-player finite game and
its any sub-game (any game constructed by restricting
the set of actions to a subset of the set of actions in the
original game) has at least one pure Nash equilibrium is
a weakly acyclic game. From Table 1, we can see any sub-
game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Now we
want to calculate the pure Nash equilibrium (equilibria).
From Table 1, we can see if the defense strategy is d4
(deploying Debian 6) or d5 (deploying FreeBSD 9), then
the utility of the defender is 1 (the utility of the attacker
is 0) not matter what action the attacker uses. From
Definition 1 and Remark 2, we know the combinations
of any attacker action and defense action d4 or d5 are
pure Nash equilibria.
Simulation results with optimal exploration
rates. Based on Table 1, we simulate the interactions
of the defender and attacker in Matlab. We choose the
exploration rates d(t) = a(t) =
1
11t1/2
., the optimal
one among p-series as discussed in Section 4.4. The
exploration deviations are chosen as ed(t) =
1
110t2 and
ea(t) =
1
110t2 . We assume that the measurement noises
are absent; i.e., wd(t) = wa(t) = 0. The duration of each
simulation (from the attack begins till the attack ends)
is 10,000 iterations and we repeat 100 identical simu-
lations. Figure 9 shows the trajectories of the defense
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Fig. 9. Trajectories of attack a(t) and defense d(t) with di-
minishing exploration rate d(t) = a(t) =
1
11t1/2
.
and attack actions in one certain simulation. And for
each simulation, we record the defense action at each
iteration. Then at each iteration t, we have 100 chosen
defense actions and we use the number of each defense
action over 100 as the probability of choosing such de-
fense action at t. The result in Figure 9 suggests that
the defense action converges to the set {d4, d5}. Notice
that the combinations of any attacker action and de-
fense action d4 or d5 are pure Nash equilibria. Then the
simulation results confirm that the convergence of the
action profiles to the set of pure Nash equilibria.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates a class of multi-player discrete
games where each player aims to maximize its own utility
function with limited information about the game of in-
terest. We propose the RL algorithm which converges to
the set of action profiles which have maximal stochastic
potential with probability one. The convergence rate of
the proposed algorithm is analytically quantified. More-
over, the performance of the algorithm is verified by two
case studies in the smart grid and cybersecurity.
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